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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)

NO. 47063-2019
CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR16-18-3886

)

)
SALVADOR SALAZAR ROBLES, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Salvador Salazar Robles pied guilty to one count of felony
DUI. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, and the district court
retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Robles contends that this sentence represents an abuse of
the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 14, 2018, law enforcement was contacted regarding a possibly intoxicated driver.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.) When the officer arrived at the
location, he saw the Ford Thunderbird vehicle described by the reporting party.

The Ford

Thunderbird swerved, striking the officer's patrol car. (PSI, p.3.) After the officer stopped the
vehicle, he smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage. (PSI, p.3.) He asked the driver, Salvador
Robles, to take field sobriety tests, but he refused and the officer was unable to obtain a valid
breath analysis from Mr. Robles. 2 (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Robles had two prior DUI convictions and his
driver's license was suspended. (PSI, p.3; R., pp.22-25.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Robles was charged by information with one count of felony
DUI and one count of driving without privileges. (R., pp.27-29.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Mr. Robles pled guilty to felony DUI. (1/22/19 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-21; p.14, Ls.15-19; R., pp.47-57.)
In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor charge. 3 (R., pp.55-56.) The State
agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and that the district court
suspend the sentence and place Mr. Robles on probation with the condition that he apply for DUI
court or drug court. 4 (1/22/19 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-21; R., pp.55-56.)

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2
Mr. Robles provided two insufficient samples and one sample of .171. (R., pp.14-15.)
3
The Guilty Plea Advisory Form indicates that Mr. Robles agreed to waive his right to appeal
his judgment of conviction, but not his sentence. (R., p.49.)
4
Mr. Robles applied to DUI court but was denied and redenied entry into the specialty court.
(R., pp.76, 78-106.) Admission was denied because Mr. Robles "does not meet substance use
disorder criteria for substance abuse treatment" according to the GAIN evaluation. (R., pp.103,
105.) Mr. Robles has been convicted of three DUis in three years. (PSI, pp.4-5, 12; 4/16/19
Tr., p.6, Ls.11-23.)
2

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor expressed concern over the fact that Mr. Robles
had not been accepted into DUI court:
[T]he issue here is if there's a possibility that we can help Mr. Robles gain control
over an apparent addiction, I can't understand why we wouldn't want to exhaust
all avenues to do so at this point, because I also think that this might lead to
essentially a change in how we have to read the plea agreement, because there's
kind of some conditions there.
Simply putting the defendant back on probation at this point, without that
structure, seems to be setting him up for some severe failure.
(4/16/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.10-20.) The district court told the parties it intended to go forward with
sentencing Mr. Robles that day because it did not think Mr. Robles would qualify for drug court
either. (4/16/19 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.9, L.5.) The prosecutor then said:
With that, then, Your Honor, the State, in the plea agreement, we agreed to a tenyear unified sentence, with the first three years fixed and determinate.
Now the issue there is that we base that on the idea that there would be acceptance
into drug court. And the way that I'm reading that plea agreement, the State
likely cannot argue for anything outside of that, and at this point, will not.
I will note that the pre-sentence investigation report does call for a period of
retained jurisdiction. That may be something that could help address those issues.
But the State is not necessarily arguing for that because I don't feel like I can
because the way that we crafted that plea agreement.
(4/16/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-21.)
Mr. Robles's counsel asked the district court to sentence Mr. Robles to eight years, with
two years fixed, but place Mr. Robles on probation. (4/16/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-8; p.12, Ls.18-20.)
Mr. Robles was sentenced to eight years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained
jurisdiction. 5 (4/16/19 Tr., p.39, Ls.7-20; R., pp.125-128.) Mr. Robles filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.136-138, 151-155.)
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Mr. Robles filed a motion asking the court to reconsider his sentence, pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(b). (R., pp.134-135.) The district court denied the motion, acknowledging that
3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, upon Mr. Robles following his plea of guilty to felony DUI?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Robles Following His Plea Of Guilty To Felony DUI
Mr. Robles asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight years,
with two years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant
has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,
577 (1979)). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Mr. Robles did not provide the Court with new or additional information in support of his
motion. (R., pp.147-150.) Mr. Robles does not challenge this decision on appeal. See State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007) (holding "[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new
information).
4

Mr. Robles does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Mr. Robles must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho
141, 145 (1991).

The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

“(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978).
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Robles’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
As Mr. Robles explained:
I come before you this day on 4-4-19 about the addiction I shall overcome. With
that said, I would like to address this Court about offering a program like Drug
Court or D.U.I. Court.
I’ve heard some real good things about it.
I believe the tools that come from this program can help me get my life back on
track to become a better member of society in the community by keeping myself
productive with more important priorities than myself such as a job, family, etc.
(R., p.124.) Mr. Robles knows his use of alcohol is causing problems in his life; he is ready to
remain abstinent. (PSI, pp.10, 21-22.) He would like treatment to help him achieve his goal of
not drinking. (PSI, p.10.) The only treatment Mr. Robles has previously received was from his
participation in AA meetings. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Robles has learned that he needs to remove
himself from bad influences, and he recognizes that he needs to find different friends to
accomplish this goal. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Robles wants to be clean and sober and be a productive
member of society. (PSI, p.11.) Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse

5

and a desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when
that court imposes its sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).
Mr. Robles does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. (PSI, p.6.)
Mr. Robles has a very good relationship with his mother—he loves her very much and she
supports him. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Robles has a good relationship with his two adult children. (PSI,
p.7.) Mr. Robles also has a good relationship with his siblings and his cousin, Ramon Renteria.
(PSI, pp.6-7.)
Mr. Robles worked for McCain Foods before his sentencing hearing. (PSI, pp.8, 25;
4/16/19 Tr., p.10, L.18 – p.11, L.13.) Prior to his employment at McCain Foods, he worked in
agriculture. (PSI, pp.8-9.) Idaho courts recognizes that good employment history should be
considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
Further, Mr. Robles expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (PSI,
p.4; 1/22/19 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-21; p.14, Ls.15-19.) Mr. Robles told the presentence investigator that
he drank four beers in a three and one-half to four-hour time period, and that he felt “ashamed
for making a mistake.” (PSI, p.4.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Robles asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, substance abuse, and his family support it would have imposed
a less severe sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Robles respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 27 th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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